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1 Introduction
Deductive reasoning is one way by which we acquire new beliefs. Some of
these beliefs so acquired amount to knowledge; others do not. Here are two prin-
ciples, each of which states a sufficient condition for acquiring knowledge through
deduction:
Single-premise closure (SPC) For any propositions P and Q, and for any sub-
ject S, if S knows P and comes to believe Q solely on the basis of competently
deducing it from P , while retaining knowledge of P throughout, then S knows
Q.
Multi-premise closure (MPC) For any propositions P1, P2, . . . , Pn, and Q, and
for any subject S, if S knows each of P1, P2, . . . , Pn and comes to believe
Q solely on the basis of competently deducing it from P1, P2, . . . , Pn, while
retaining knowledge of each of P1, P2, . . . , Pn throughout, then S knows Q.
Although both principles are prima facie plausible, SPC is often thought to be on
firmer ground than MPC—it’s often thought that the phenomenon of risk aggre-
gation poses a problem for the latter but not the former.1 But Lasonen-Aarnio
(2008) and Schechter (2013) have recently challenged this thought. The former ar-
gues that, insofar as risk aggregation poses a problem for MPC, it poses a similar
1The lottery paradox and the preface paradox are often thought to pose problems for MPC (or
versions of MPC) while leaving SPC (or versions of SPC) intact. For more on the lottery paradox,
see Kyburg 1970; for an attempt to solve it, see Nelkin 2000. For more on the preface paradox,
see Makinson 1965; for an attempt to solve it, see Ryan 1991.
2problem for SPC. The latter argues that SPC (or a version of it) succumbs to the
problem outright.
In this paper, I defend SPC against Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter—I argue
that they fail to show that the phenomenon of risk aggregation poses a genuine
problem for SPC.2
2 Do MPC and SPC stand or fall together?
Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) holds that ‘of the probabilistic considerations for
rejecting MPC, . . . the strongest and least contentious arises in connection with
objective chance’ (159). Further, she thinks that ‘arguments against MPC making
use of the notion of objective chance can be turned into arguments against SPC
(ibid.).3
On the face of it, we may know that a proposition is true even when there’s a
non-zero probability or risk of its being false. Now, suppose S knows, of each of P1,
P2, . . . , and Pn, that it’s true, even while each proposition has some risk of being
false. And suppose that S comes to believe Q solely on the basis of competently
deducing it from P1, P2, . . . , Pn, while retaining knowledge of each of P1, P2, . . . ,
Pn throughout. By MPC, S knows Q. But given the aggregation of risk over P1,
P2, . . . , and Pn, the risk of Q being false might be high enough that, pace MPC, S
doesn’t know Q after all.
For instance, suppose that n = 20 and suppose that P1, P2, . . . , and P20 are
probabilistically independent of each other. Suppose also that each of P1, P2, . . . ,
and P20 has a 0.05 chance of being false and that Q is their conjunction. In such
a case, the chance of Q’s being true is approximately 0.36. The worry is that this
value is too low for S to know that Q. Even if S believes that Q and even if Q is
2Following Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) and Schechter (2013), this paper focuses on the problem
that the phenomenon of risk aggregation is supposed to pose for SPC. One might wish to deny
SPC (or versions of it) for other reasons—for instance, to try to solve the problem of external
world scepticism. See, for example, Dretske 1970 and Nozick 1981.
3In discussing Lasonen-Aarnio’s arguments, I’ll focus on objective chance—as she does—but
Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) holds that similar points can be made with respect to other notions of
probability (159).
3in fact true, the low chance of Q being true means that it is a matter of epistemic
luck that S’s belief that Q is true. This disqualifies the belief from amounting to
knowledge, given that a belief’s amounting to knowledge is incompatible with its
being true by luck. Or so an opponent of MPC might argue (Lasonen-Aarnio 2008,
162–3).
The above poses a worry for MPC. But, at first blush, SPC is safe from a
similar worry. The risk of the conjunction of P1, P2, . . . , and P20 being false is a
function of the risk of each individual proposition’s being false—risk accrues over
P1, P2, . . . , and P20. But suppose S comes to believe Q solely on the basis of compe-
tently deducing it from P , while retaining knowledge of P throughout. (Henceforth,
the clause about retaining knowledge of the relevant premise or premises will often
be left implicit.) At first blush, the risk of Q’s being false is a function of just the
risk of P ’s being false. So, at first blush, risk aggregation poses a problem for MPC
but not SPC.
Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) demurs. She writes:
When a subject comes to believe a proposition Q solely based on com-
petent deduction from P , her epistemic standing with respect to Q will
depend both on her epistemic standing with respect to Q and on the
competence of her deduction. But because competence doesn’t require
infallibility, the risk involved in her belief in P and the deductive risk
involved in the deduction itself can add up so that despite satisfying the
antecedent of SPC, the subject fails to satisfy its consequent, and fails
to come to know Q. (ibid., 159–60; Lasonen-Aarnio’s emphases)
Suppose that risk aggregation poses a real worry for MPC. According to Lasonen-
Aarnio, it’ll pose a real worry for SPC too. In the case of MPC, risk accrues over
multiple premises. In the case of SPC, we’re concerned with just one premise, but
risk accrues over this single premise and the deduction itself. In some cases, this
risk might be great enough that, even should the relevant single-premise deduction
result in a true belief, the chance of the resultant belief’s being true would be too
4low for it to count as knowledge.4 Thus the phenomenon of risk aggregation poses
a problem for SPC if it poses a problem for MPC. Or so Lasonen-Aarnio argues.
Let’s grant that we may know P when its chance of being true is less than 1,
and let’s grant that knowing P requires that the chance of P ’s being false is not too
great. In addition, let’s grant that there’s such a thing as deductive risk—that there
is always, or at least often, a very slight chance of a subject’s epistemic capacities
misfiring’ and that ‘there is always a non-zero chance of some bizarre quantum-
event occurring in our brains that would cause attempted deductions to fail’ (ibid.,
164–5). Such risk, according to Lasonen-Aarnio, is compatible with one’s deduction
being competent—as she puts it, ‘a subject’s deduction can be competent even if
there is a very slight objective chance of failure’ (ibid., 164). I’ll argue, however,
that the risk of a single premise being false and the risk involved in performing a
deduction do not accrue in any way that poses a genuine threat to SPC. Admittedly,
a subject may perform a competent single-premise deduction even if there’s a slight
chance of failure. But this chance of failure is benign. To see why, it’ll help to ask:
What is the kind of failure at issue?
Suppose we know P and come to believe Q by competently deducing it from
P . One might suggest that our competent deduction has some chance of failing in
that it has some chance of leading us from a true belief that P to a false belief that
Q. But this suggestion can’t be right. A single-premise deduction is competent
only if the premise entails the conclusion—Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) agrees with this
claim (167). But when P entails Q, there’s no chance that our deduction will lead
us from a true belief to a false belief. So any chance of Q being false will be due
solely to the chance of P being false. More precisely, the chance that our belief that
Q is true, in a situation in which we know P and P entails Q, will be at least as
high as the chance that our belief that P is true.
But if there is no chance of a competent deduction failing in the way sug-
4Williamson (2009) has challenged the claim that knowledge that P is incompatible with there
being a low chance that P is true. But I’ll assume that the claim is true. This assumption is
unproblematic for the purposes of this paper—if anything, it makes SPC harder to defend.
5gested above, in what other sense might there be a slight chance of failure? Well,
even if we will go on to perform a competent deduction, there might be a chance
that we go on to perform an incompetent deduction instead.5 Suppose we are in
fact going to competently deduce Q from P & (P → Q). Still, since we are fal-
lible, there’s a chance that we might instead deduce ¬Q from P & (P → Q) or
deduce some proposition Q∗ that resembles Q but is not entailed by P & (P → Q).
For as Lasonen-Aarnio points out, our epistemic capacities might misfire or there
might be some strange quantum event going on in the our brains that will cause
our attempted deduction to fail.
I’ll argue, however, that the chance of a subject performing an incompetent
deduction is irrelevant to whether SPC holds.6 To begin, I’ll give an example
in which, intuitively, a competent single-premise deduction yields knowledge even
though the chance of performing an incompetent deduction is very high.
Consider Beth, a pre-eminent logician with excellent deductive abilities. One
day, her jealous rival, Ivan, decides to sabotage her career. While Beth is asleep,
an evil scientist in Ivan’s employ inserts a chip into Beth’s brain. This chip is
designed to mess with Beth’s attempts at single-premise deduction. Whenever
5Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) is right that ‘competence doesn’t require infallibility’ (159).
6My distinction between the two senses in which there might be a chance of failure bears some
similarity to Smith’s (2013) distinction between an unconditional error risk and a conditional
error risk. Suppose a subject S competently deduces Q from P . According to Smith (2013),
unconditional error risk has to do with the probability that S’s reasoning process will generate
a false belief whereas conditional error risk has to do with the probability that such a process
will generate a false belief given that it generates a belief that Q (1073). Further, Smith argues
that the former kind of risk is epistemically benign, whereas the latter risk is no greater than
the risk of P being false (ibid.). I’m hugely sympathetic to Smith’s defence of SPC. But it is
incomplete in certain respects. First, Smith (2013) argues for his claim that unconditional error
risk is benign by way of analogy with other cases that do not involve SPC (1075–8). He also thinks
that his argument is ‘somewhat speculative’ (1076). But while I’ll consider an analogy too, I’ll
offer an example in which it’s intuitively clear that a subject may gain knowledge via a competent
single-premise deduction even though the chance of her performing an incompetent deduction and
ending up with a false belief is very high. This gives us direct evidence for thinking that the
chance of a subject performing an incompetent deduction—or what Smith calls ‘unconditional
error risk’—is benign. Second, Smith thinks that his ‘objections to Lasonen-Aarnio’s argument
[against SPC] apply equally to the argument that Schechter mounts’ (1072). But he does not
address Schechter’s (2013) intuition that, after we have performed a long sequence of competent
single-premise deductions, we should think it likely that we have made a mistake somewhere in our
chain of reasoning. Schechter takes this intuition to support his claim that SPC (or a version of it)
is false. To defend SPC thoroughly, we need to resist the intuition or show that, pace Schechter,
it does not undermine SPC. I adopt the latter strategy in section 3.
6Beth’s deductive process kicks into motion, there’s a 90% chance that the chip will
be activated, causing her epistemic capacities to misfire, and making her attempt
at deduction go awry. When the chip is activated, Beth might choose an incorrect
deductive rule and apply it, or she might choose a correct rule but misapply it.7 In
either case, it’s unlikely that even if she performs the deduction on a premise she
knows to be true, she will end up with a true belief. And if she does happen to end
up with a true belief, it will be a matter of luck that she does so.
However, the chip’s design is not perfect—there’s a 10% chance that when
Beth starts performing a deduction, the chip won’t be activated. In this case, Beth
will go on to perform her deduction as if there is no chip implanted in her brain. In
particular, she will go on to perform her deduction competently, which involves her
choosing the correct deductive rule and applying it correctly. Suppose Beth wakes
up the day after the chip implant, blissfully unaware of Ivan’s machinations. In
particular, suppose she is unaware that she has been implanted with a chip. The
first thing Beth does, upon waking up, is to carry out a single-premise deduction
on P , which she knows to be true. Now, the chance of a successful deduction is
very low. But against the odds, as Beth begins her deduction, the chip fails to
be activated, and she goes on to competently deduce Q from P—as she would do
normally. Throughout the process, she is not aware that there’s a chip in her brain.
Intuitively, the case is one in which Beth may come to know Q by competently
deducing it from P .8 But if this intuition is right, then we have reason to think
that, pace Lasonen-Aarnio, the chance of performing an incompetent single-premise
deduction isn’t relevant to whether SPC holds. For suppose it is. Then whenever
Beth performs a single-premise deduction on a known premise, the chance of the
premise being false and the chance of her performing an incompetent deduction will
accumulate. But then, the very high chance of an incompetent deduction will mean
7Perhaps, even though she should be reasoning by modus ponens, she chooses to reason by
some incorrect rule. Or perhaps she correctly chooses to reason by modus ponens but ends up
performing such reasoning poorly. Schechter (2013) calls the distinction between applying an
incorrect rule and misapplying a correct rule the ‘competence/performance distinction’ (431).
8This intuition seems robust whether the chance of the chip being activated is 90% or as high
as 99.9%.
7that any true belief she gains by competent deduction falls short of knowledge.
Now, the chip’s being activated is akin to Beth’s epistemic capacities misfir-
ing or to some bizarre quantum event occurring in her brain that would cause an
attempted deduction to fail.9 But if the chance of the former happening poses no
threat to SPC, then the chance of the latter happening should pose no threat as
well. Granted, an incompetent deduction in the former case is induced artificially,
whereas an incompetent deduction in the latter case might be due to natural causes.
But there is no reason to think that this difference is epistemically significant.
Although the Beth case is merely an example, there’s a principled reason for
holding that SPC is not affected by the chance of a subject performing an incom-
petent deduction. As Pritchard (2005) notes, certain forms of luck are compatible
with knowledge. So there will be certain cases in which knowledge is compatible
with low chance. In particular, there’s a principled reason for holding that when one
knows P and competently deduces Q from P , one’s knowing Q is compatible with a
low chance of the deduction being performed competently (as in Beth’s case). For
the kind of luck that such a low chance engenders is compatible with knowledge.
To see why, it’ll help to consider an example from Unger (1968), which
Pritchard discusses. As Unger notes, knowledge acquired by luck is knowledge
9An anonymous reviewer suggested that, perhaps, the former is not akin to the latter—perhaps
there is a sense in which the chip is external Beth’s mind, and when the chip is activated, it is not
really her who is doing the reasoning. If that’s right, then one might grant that in the example
above, Beth does come to know Q by competently deducing it from P—but the chance of her
performing an incompetent deduction was never 90% to begin with, since the chip’s activating
90% of the time does not affect the reliability of Beth’s reasoning.
Even if the chip is external to Beth’s mind, it seems to me that when it activates and causes
Beth’s epistemic capacities to misfire, it is still Beth who is doing the reasoning. After all, our
glasses and hearing aids are external to us, but whether they improve or impair our perceptual
abilities, we are still the ones who are doing the perceiving. Now, perhaps things are different
when long-term and widespread changes in our ability to reason occur. And perhaps, talk of an
implant in the brain tends to bring up images of brainwashing. Let us thus modify the example
above slightly. Suppose there’s a pill that has a 90% chance of making Beth perform a deduction
incompetently when she wakes up, and suppose that the effects of the pill are one-off. Suppose
also that Beth accidentally takes the pill and is unaware that she has done so. As luck would
have it, the pill doesn’t work, and when Beth wakes up, she competently deduces Q from P , as
she would have done normally. Intuitively, the case is one in which Beth may come to know Q
by competently deducing it from P , despite the high chance of her performing an incompetent
deduction. Granted, pills and drugs are also external to our mind. But we are prepared to think
that some of these substances boost, while others impair, our cognitive performances without
being inclined to think that they turn us into another person—at least given that the effects are
short-term and local.
8nonetheless: a person might know that he will be fired even if he acquires such
knowledge by accident, say, by accidentally overhearing his employer say that he
will be fired (159). Even though he is lucky to acquire the evidence that he does
in support of his belief that he’ll be fired—and we may imagine that the chance
of him acquiring such evidence is low—such a kind of luck, which Pritchard (2005)
calls ‘evidential epistemic luck’, is compatible with knowledge (136). Also, since
the employee is lucky to form the belief that he does—and we may imagine that the
chance of him forming such a belief is low, given that the chance of him acquiring
the relevant evidence is low—such a kind of luck, which Pritchard calls ‘doxastic
epistemic luck’, is compatible with knowledge too (ibid., 137–8).10
Of course, the above is not meant to suggest that forming a true belief based
on very good evidence or justification is sufficient for knowledge. After all, we might
be in a Gettier situation. Suppose we enter Fake Barn Country but have no evidence
that suggests that we have done so. In Fake Barn Country, there are a few real
barns, but the majority of the structures that look like barns are—unbeknownst to
us—very realistic-looking barn facades (Goldman 1976). Suppose we come across
something that looks very much like a barn. Based on our perceptual experience as
of a barn, we come to believe that there’s a barn in front of us. Our belief seems to
be justified. If, as it happens, we are looking at one of the few real barns in Fake
Barn Country, our belief is true as well. Still, intuitively, it does not amount to
knowledge. For in such an environment, we could easily have looked at a barn facade
and formed the same belief based on a qualitatively similar perceptual experience.
Our belief, though true, is true as a matter of luck. (And notice that the chance of
such a belief being true is low; more precisely, in Fake Barn Country, a belief that
there’s a barn in front of us, based on our perceptual experience as of a barn, has a
low chance of being true). Such luck, which Pritchard calls ‘veritic epistemic luck’,
10To be more careful, we might hold that the employee’s knowing that he’ll be fired is compatible
with the claim that he is lucky to form the belief that he’ll be fired, where the belief is properly
based on the evidence in question. For suppose he ignores the evidence and forms a belief at
random. If, by luck, he happens to form the belief that he’ll be fired, then since this belief isn’t
properly based on the relevant evidence, it does not amount to knowledge.
9is unlike evidential epistemic luck and doxastic epistemic luck—it is not benign
(ibid., 146).
How does the above bear on whether SPC is affected by the chance of a sub-
ject performing an incompetent deduction? Recall Beth, implanted with a chip that
has a 90% chance of being activated whenever she starts to perform a deduction.
Against the odds, when Beth starts performing a deduction on P , which she knows
to be true, the chip isn’t activated, and she goes on to competently deduce that
Q. Although the chance of Beth’s performing an incompetent deduction is high,
that is no bar to her knowing Q. For even granting that such a high chance means
that it is a matter of luck that Beth performs a competent deduction, such luck
is benign. Beth is doxastically epistemically lucky: her belief that Q—based on a
competent deduction from P—is formed against the odds, given the high chance
of the chip activating. (If one thinks that Beth’s competently deducing Q from
P gives her evidence for believing Q, then one might think that evidential luck is
involved too.) But since doxastic epistemic luck is benign, the high chance of her
performing an incompetent deduction—whether by employing an incorrect deduc-
tive rule or by misapplying a correct deductive rule—will not deprive her of the
relevant knowledge.11
Granted, veritic epistemic luck might still deprive Beth of knowledge: if
there’s a very low chance that her belief that Q is true, Beth might not know Q.
But in the case imagined, no such luck is at play. Beth’s deduction of Q from P is
competent only if P entails Q. But given that Beth knows P and that P entails Q,
it is not a matter of luck that Q is true. Speaking in terms of chance, the chance
that Beth’s belief that Q is true, in a situation in which she knows P and P entails
Q, will be at least as high as the chance that her belief that P is true. But given
that Beth knows P only if the chance of P being true is high enough for her belief
in P not to be true merely by luck, the chance of Q being true will also be high
11Smith (2013) also observes that when the chance of performing an incompetent deduction is
high, but a person goes on to perform a competent deduction, the person is doxastically epistem-
ically lucky.
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enough for her belief in Q not to be true merely by luck.
The reasoning with respect to Beth generalises. To produce a counterexam-
ple to SPC, we need a case in which the antecedent of SPC is true but its consequent
is false. In other words, we need a case in which, first, a subject knows P and comes
to believe Q solely on the basis of competently deducing it from P , and second, even
given such conditions, the subject does not know Q. Speaking in terms of luck, a
counterexample to SPC will involve a case in which one knows P and competently
deduces Q from P , but one’s belief that Q is true as a matter of luck. But veritic
epistemic luck is not at play when we know P and competently deduce Q from P .
It might be a matter of luck that we perform a competent deduction and form a
belief that Q instead of some other belief not entailed by P (just as it might be a
matter of luck that the person in Unger’s example forms a belief that he will be
fired). But any luck that leads to our competently deducing Q from P will not in
itself deprive us of our inferential justification for Q and our knowledge that Q. For
such luck is either evidential epistemic luck or doxastic epistemic luck, and both
are benign. It is not a matter of (veritic epistemic) luck, however, that our belief
that Q, having been formed via a competent deduction from P , is true (just as it
is not a matter of luck that the person’s belief that he will be fired, having been
formed by hearing his employer say that he will be fired, is true). The chance that
Q is true, in a situation in which we know P and P entails Q, is at least as high
as the chance that P is true. But given that one knows P only if the chance of P
being true is high enough for one’s belief that P not to be true merely by luck, the
chance of Q being true should also be high enough for one’s belief that Q not to be
true merely by luck.
3 The Long Sequence Argument
Lasonen-Aarnio’s argument that risk aggregation poses a problem for SPC
insofar as it poses a problem for MPC does not work. But there’s yet another
argument against SPC to consider—namely, what Schechter (2013) calls ‘the long
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sequence argument’, which he deploys against the following version of SPC:
Single-premise closure for justified belief (SPCJ) For any propositions P and
Q, and for any subject S, if S has a justified belief that P and comes to believe
that Q solely on the basis of competently deducing it from P , while retaining
the justified belief that P throughout the deduction, then S has a justified
belief that Q.
Schechter (2013) thinks that his argument against SPCJ can be tweaked so that
it becomes an argument against SPC too. In discussing Schechter’s argument, I’ll
focus on SPCJ (or rather, as we’ll see, a slightly amended version of it). But I take
it that a successful response to Schechter’s argument against SPCJ will, suitably
modified, also be a successful response to a corresponding argument against SPC.12
Schechter (2013) considers two warm-up counterexamples to SPCJ that he
thinks can be answered by modifying SPCJ slightly. First, we sometimes have
misleading evidence that we’ve applied an incorrect deductive rule (436). Suppose
twenty of the world’s best logicians each tells us that a particular deductive rule that
we’ve employed in a single-premise deduction is incorrect. Even if the deduction is
in fact competent, and we are justified in believing the premise, one might have the
intuition that we’re not justified in believing the conclusion, and take this intuition
to pose a problem for SPCJ. Second, we sometimes have misleading evidence that
we’ve misapplied a correct rule. Suppose we’ve applied a particular rule to perform
a competent deduction on a single justified premise. But suppose that someone we
have good reason to believe is reliable tells us that a pill we took earlier tends to
make people treat certain invalid inferences as instances of a deductively correct
rule. In this case, one might likewise have the intuition that we are not justified in
believing the relevant conclusion.
Here’s a slightly amended version of SPCJ that Schechter (2013) thinks will
get around the objections:
12Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) discusses a version of the argument briefly (171). I focus on Schechter’s
version since he discusses the argument in greater detail than does Lasonen-Aarnio.
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(SPCJ*) Necessarily, if S has a justified belief that p, comes to believe
that q solely on the basis of competently deducing it from p, while re-
taining the justified belief that p throughout the deduction, and S does
not have a defeater for the claim that the deduction was competently per-
formed, then S has a justified belief that q. (437; Schechter’s emphasis)
SPCJ* gets around the above counterexamples to SPCJ, since both counterex-
amples involve us having defeaters for the claim that the relevant deduction was
competently performed. Further, Schechter (2013) thinks that the qualification
that there be no such defeater is ‘not ad hoc’, since ‘[o]ne of the lessons of con-
temporary epistemology is that epistemic principles should generally include such
clauses’ (437). I agree with Schechter. But the following question arises: Is there a
counterexample to SPCJ* that does not involve one having a defeater for the claim
that one’s deduction was competently performed?
Schechter thinks so. His argument against SPCJ* runs as follows:
Consider a very long sequence of competently performed simple single-
premise deductions, where the conclusion of one deduction is the premise
of the next. Suppose that I am justified in believing the initial premise
(to a very high degree), but have no other evidence about the interme-
diate or final conclusions. Suppose that I come to believe the conclusion
(to a very high degree) solely on the basis of going through the long
deduction. I should think it likely that I’ve made a mistake somewhere
in my reasoning. So it is epistemically irresponsible for me to believe
the conclusion. My belief in the conclusion is unjustified . . .
[The above] provides a counterexample to [SPCJ*]. The difficulty stems
from the fact that the long deduction is built out of short simple deduc-
tions. So the problem can’t be solved by saying that the long deduction
is not a competent deduction. Even if the long deduction doesn’t count
as competent, it would be implausible to claim that one of the short
deductions is not competent. (Which one?) So we can apply [SPCJ*] to
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the short simple deductions one at a time. Thus, there must be a failure
of closure for some short simple single-premise competent deduction.
(438–9)
Note that Schechter (2013) holds explicitly that, in the example above, ‘there is
no defeater of the competence of any of the short simple deductions’ (439). The
example is meant to be one in which, for each single-premise deduction, there is no
reason for one to think that one’s deduction isn’t competent.
I won’t question two ‘key principles’ of Schechter’s long sequence argument
(ibid., 440). First, I won’t question what Schechter (2013) calls the ‘Existence of
Rational Self-Doubt’, according to which ‘[t]hinkers can (and do) have justified
beliefs that their deductive reasoning is not fully reliable’ (ibid.). In particular, I
agree with Schechter that there could be a long sequence of competently performed
single-premise deductions such that, by the end of the sequence, we are justified in
believing that we have probably made a mistake somewhere in our line of reasoning.
For even if all the deductions have in fact been competently performed, we know that
we are fallible and cognitively limited. We may also know that we have been prone
to making mistakes when performing similar chains of single-premise deductions on
previous occasions.
Second, I won’t question what Schechter (2013) calls the ‘Relevance of Ratio-
nal Self-Doubt’, according to which ‘[h]aving a justified belief that one’s deductive
reasoning is not fully reliable partially defeats one’s justification for the conclusion
of a deduction’ (ibid.). In particular, I grant Schechter that being justified in be-
lieving that we have probably made a mistake somewhere in a long line of reasoning
can deprive us of justification for believing the conclusion of that line of reasoning.
Other than not questioning Schechter’s two key principles, I further grant
that we can’t ward off his purported counterexample to SPCJ* by saying that the
long deduction isn’t competent or by saying that one of the short deductions isn’t
competent (ibid., 439).
However, even given all that has been granted, it does not follow that ‘there
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must be a failure of closure for some . . . single-premise competent deduction’—
Schechter’s conclusion that SPCJ* is false is drawn too quickly (ibid.). Although
there’s an incremental loss of justification as we move down the chain of single-
premise deductions, such loss admits of a prosaic explanation that has nothing to
do with the failure of SPCJ*.
It’s uncontroversial that we might be justified in believing a proposition ini-
tially, but with the passage of time, we lose our original justification due to our
fading memories or to new defeating evidence that comes our way. Such loss of jus-
tification does not mean that we lacked justification for believing the proposition
to begin with. Suppose we gain justification for believing a proposition via per-
ceptual experience. Once we stop having the experience in question, we might lose
some justification for the belief as time passes. And if we do, it’ll be too hasty to
attribute this loss to the justificatory impotence of perception. Perceptual experi-
ences may grant us justification for our beliefs, but they do not guarantee that such
justification will be retained or will not be defeated by new evidence that comes
our way.
To illustrate, suppose we visit a friend’s house and form a justified belief
that there is a statue of a dog in the garden, where the belief is based on a relevant
visual experience. Long after we’ve gone home, we retain the belief in our memory,
but we no longer have as clear an impression of the experience as before. In such a
case, we may well have less justification for the belief than we had initially. After
all, our memories are imperfect and we know this. So it is reasonable for us to have
at least some doubt as to whether they are in good order with respect to the belief.
We may wonder, for example, whether we really did have the visual experience in
question. This does not mean, however, that the belief did not enjoy the amount
of justification it had initially.
Similarly, suppose we gain justification for believing a proposition via a com-
petent single-premise deduction. We might subsequently lose some of this justifica-
tion. And if we do, it’ll be too hasty to attribute this loss to the failure of SPCJ*.
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After all, SPCJ* doesn’t—and shouldn’t—guarantee that we’ll retain any justifica-
tion gained via a competent single-premise deduction. Although this is a mundane
point, it bears on the validity of the long sequence argument, as the following ex-
ample will show.
At time t, Sue—a typical human being with less than perfect memory—
has a justified belief that A and competently deduces B from A. Ten years later,
seeming to remember that B, she competently deduces C from B. Ten years after
that, seeming to remember that C, she competently deduces D from C. And so
on, until seventy years after t, she deduces H from G. Here, we have a sequence
of competently performed single-premise deductions, where the conclusion of one
deduction serves as the premise of the next. We may suppose that Sue is justified
in believing the initial premise A, but has no other evidence about the intermediate
or final conclusions. We may also suppose that Sue comes to believe the final
conclusion solely on the basis of going through the sequence of deductions. Should
Sue think it likely that she’s has made a mistake somewhere in her reasoning? Is
her belief in the conclusion unjustified?
Even if we answer ‘yes’ to both questions, it would be too quick to conclude
that the foregoing is a counterexample to SPCJ*. Let’s grant that Sue is not justified
in believing H even though she has a justified belief that A, and her belief that H
is based on a valid chain of inferences from A to H. And let’s grant that there is
an increasing loss of justification as we move through Sue’s chain of deductions. It
would be too quick, however, to pin this loss on SPCJ*’s failure. A more prosaic
explanation is available.
Although memory preserves justification, it does not preserve it perfectly—
at least for non-ideal beings like Sue. Suppose that immediately upon performing
the first deduction from A to B, Sue’s belief that B is justified. But when she
performs her second deduction from B to C ten years after t, it’s unlikely that her
belief that B will be as justified as it was at t. First, just before Sue performs
her second deduction, her memory of B being true may well be less vivid than it
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was immediately after the first deduction (just as our memory of the statue in our
friend’s garden is less vivid than it was before). Second, given the long passage
of time that has elapsed and a less than perfect memory, all she might remember
is that she deduced B from A at one point—if she even remembers that at all—
without remembering the details involved in the performance of the deduction.
Given that she knows that she is fallible, short of performing the deduction again,
she may even doubt that she performed it correctly ten years ago (just as we may
doubt whether we really had a certain visual experience on which our current belief
about the statue was originally based). Such doubt may then lead to her losing
some justification for believing B. Similar points hold with respect to any of Sue’s
subsequent deductions.13
Note that the loss in justification in the example above does not impugn
SPCJ*. To show that SPCJ* is false, Schechter needs to show that there are some
cases in which we have a justified belief that P , competently deduce Q from P , and
yet, at the very point when the deduction has been completed, enjoy less justification
for the belief that Q than for the belief that P . But Sue’s loss of justification is
compatible with SPCJ* holding true. Her imperfect memory, which fails to preserve
justification perfectly across time, leads to such loss after a deduction or in between
deductions. But the failure of memory to preserve justification perfectly across
time is no bar to one’s acquiring justification via single-premise deductions (just
as it would not affect her acquiring justification via perception, although any such
acquired justification may subsequently grow weaker). At the end of each deduction,
her belief in the relevant conclusion may well enjoy as much justification as her belief
in the relevant premise. It is only after each deduction that, with the passing of
the years, justification is lost.14 For example, when Sue deduces B from A, she
13Cf. Burge (1995). To be clear, I’m not claiming that successful deductions must appeal
to premises about one’s memory. As Burge writes, ‘[i]t is one thing to rely on memory in a
demonstration, and another to use premises about memory’; and while ‘[a]ny reasoning in time
must rely on memory . . . not all reasoning must use premises about memory or the past’. (ibid.,
276–7)
14One might think that, even as Sue is performing a single-premise deduction competently, and
the deduction is fresh in her mind, her having reason to believe that she is fallible means that she
has reason to believe that there’s a possibility that she’ll make a mistake this time, which in turn
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may have as much justification for believing B as she has for believing A. But after
ten years, as her memories of B being true and of having performed a competent
deduction degrade, her justification for believing B decreases to a certain amount.
Now, at that point, when she deduces C from B, she may enjoy this same amount
of justification for believing C. But again, as the years go by, this amount of
justification for believing C will decrease further, and so on.
The example above is constructed partly for dramatic effect. Similar points
hold even if the relevant deductions take place a much shorter time apart, as is prob-
ably intended to be the case in Schechter’s example. Suppose that Sue’s deductions
take place at one-second intervals. Given the shorter duration of time between de-
ductions, the effects of her imperfect memory as she goes from one deduction to
another might be hardly noticeable. But if we increase the length of the sequence of
deductions, even tiny losses of justification can accumulate—to the extent that we
would not be justified in believing the final conclusion. But as before, such losses
of justification do not impugn SPCJ*.
One might wish to construct an example in which a subject has a perfect
memory, or in which all the deductions are done instantaneously, so that any loss
in justification cannot be attributed to the subject’s having an imperfect memory.
Consequently, one might think that, in such a case, the intuition that we are not
justified in believing the conclusion of a long sequence of competent single-premise
deductions is to be explained by the failure of SPCJ*. But such an example would be
means that she should entertain some doubt as to the competence of her deduction. One might
then take this to be a problem for SPCJ*—one might take such doubt to show that Sue can have
enough justification for believing a premise without having enough justification for believing the
relevant conclusion. Note, however, that the foregoing argument is crucially different from the long
sequence argument. The latter depends largely on the intuition that, at the end of a long sequence
of competent single-premise deductions, one is not justified in believing the final conclusion. The
failure of SPCJ* is then taken to be the best explanation of this intuition. The current argument,
however, takes aim at SPCJ* directly. Now, a discussion of the argument’s merits will take us
beyond the aim of this paper, which is to defend SPC and SPCJ* against specific arguments from
Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter. But it is at least worth noting that the relevant intuition with
respect to the long sequence argument is reasonably strong, whereas it is less obvious whether
the following claim is true: Even while one is performing a deduction competently, merely having
reason to believe that one is fallible should deprive one of some justification for believing the
conclusion of the deduction. In fact, one might think that such a claim is precisely what the long
sequence argument aims to support.
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unrealistic. It would not involve non-ideal beings with limited cognitive abilities like
you and me—beings who do not have perfect memories and who take a relatively
fair amount of time to perform even simple single-premise deductions. Now, I
take it that Schechter intends his original example to involve a typical non-ideal
human being. For the example derives much of its initial force from our imagining
ourselves in a similar situation. When we imagine ourselves performing a long
sequence of deductions, we have the intuition that we should think it likely that
we have made a mistake in our reasoning and that we are not justified in believing
the final conclusion. But if the example is tweaked, and the subject involved has a
perfect memory or can perform a long sequence of deductions instantaneously, it’s
no longer clear what the relevant intuition should be—the example loses its initial
force.15
One might also object that although it’s possible to appeal to our imperfect
memories in order to offer an explanation of the aforementioned intuition, I haven’t
completely ruled out an explanation that postulates the failure of SPCJ*. Perhaps
the loss of justification that occurs as we go through a chain of deductions is overde-
termined. Or perhaps some justification is lost due to our imperfect memories, and
some is lost due to the failure of SPCJ*. But here, it is useful to recall the aim
of this paper. As mentioned, conventional wisdom has it that the phenomenon of
risk aggregation poses a problem for MPC but not for SPC. Lasonen-Aarnio and
Schechter have sought to challenge conventional wisdom, whereas I’ve sought to de-
fend it. My aim is not to offer arguments for believing SPC or SPCJ*, but to defend
such principles against arguments that have been levelled at them. Schechter’s long
sequence argument is one such argument, and the onus is on Schechter to provide
15What if, instead of considering a subject with perfect memory, we consider human beings with
better or worse memories? (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.) It seems
that no matter who we pick, we’ll have the intuition that if a relevant sequence of competent
deductions is long enough, he or she she will not be justified in believing the final conclusion.
Does this show that an appeal to memory does not help explain the relevant intuition after all? I
don’t think so. For each human being with a less than perfect memory, there will be a sequence
of competent deductions that is long enough that he or she will not be justified in believing its
conclusion. But it seems that, all things being equal, the worse (or better) a person’s memory,
the shorter (or longer) such a sequence will need to be.
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a compelling counterexample to SPCJ*. But I’ve argued that he has not succeeded
in doing so. The intuition that we’re not justified in believing the final conclusion
of a long sequence of competent single-premise deductions admits of a prosaic ex-
planation. In the absence of reason to think that such an explanation cannot be
right, it’ll be hasty to hold that the intuition has to be explained by the failure of
SPCJ*.
4 Conclusion
Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) argues that insofar as risk aggregation poses a prob-
lem for MPC, it poses a problem for SPC too, whereas Schechter (2013) argues that
risk aggregation poses a problem for SPC outright. I’ve argued that neither has
succeeded in creating any genuine problem for SPC.16 Risk aggregation does seem
to pose a problem for MPC. But as things stand, it leaves SPC (or SPCJ*) intact.17
16For more discussion of SPC (that has a different focus from this paper), see Hawthorne (2004),
Wedgwood (2012), Williamson (2009).
17Thanks to an anonymous reviewer and to the audience at the 2015 Australasian Association of
Philosophy Conference for valuable comments. I’ve also benefitted from discussion with Michael
Pelczar, Ben Blumson, and the honours students in my epistemology class in 2015. Thanks, in
particular, to Bernadette Chin for feedback on a draft of the paper.
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